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Abstract
This paper presents a multitask principal-agent model to examine how environmental
liability rules for individual managers within a corporate hierarchy aﬀect, on the one
hand, the incentive schemes the organization provides and, on the other hand, the choice
between a functional or a product-based organizational structure. If managers are risk
neutral, a product-based organization dominates a functional organization and allows
to obtain ﬁrst-best eﬀort level. If, moreover, there are no diseconomies of span, both
organizational forms are equivalent. It is also shown that for the dominant function,
eﬀort levels are higher in a product-based organization than in a functional one. With
risk averse managers, no organizational structure dominates the other in general, but
we are able to identify under which conditions it does not matter who is held liable for
environmental damages.
Keywords: contracts, liability, ﬁrm structure, principal-agent
JEL-codes: K3; L2; Q2
∗Corresponding author. Royal Military Academy, Economics & Management, Avenue de la Renaissance
30, B-1000 Brussels, Phone: (+32)-2-7376457, Fax: (+32)-2-7376512, E-mail: laurent.franckx@rma.ac.be
†The authors beneﬁted from their interaction with seminar participants at the Center for Economic Studies,
Catholic University of Leuven. Special thanks go to Bert Willems for his insightful comments.
11 Introduction
Internalization of negative externalities caused by the production of goods and services has
predominantly been investigated within the standard neoclassical framework. Fundamental in
neoclassical theory is that the ﬁrm is viewed as a single decision maker and as such is treated
as a “black box”. That is, decisions that are made at the corporate and subsequent the lower
managerial levels are treated as if taken and implemented by a single agent. However, most of
the economic activities still take place within the boundaries of organizations (Stiglitz [23]).
An emphasis on environmental policy at the corporate level would therefore complement the
many studies that have been conducted within neoclassical theory.
A natural way to study this is by employing a (multi-task) principal-agent framework.
A ﬁrst issue that has been investigated using such a framework is the relative eﬃciency of
diﬀerent penalty schemes (civil liability of the corporation versus civil liability of individ-
ual managers, criminal sanctions taken against individual managers). To the best of our
knowledge, Kornhauser [14] and Sykes [24, 25] are the seminal papers in this tradition (see
Kraakman [8] for a recent literature review on this issue), while Segerson and Tietenberg [20]
oﬀer a ﬁrst application to the speciﬁc problem of environmental enforcement.
A second issue is the allocation of environmental resources within the corporate bound-
aries, which has been initiated by Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [9, 10]. For instance, Gabel
and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [9] examine the eﬀect of monetary incentives within corporations on
environmental risk reducing activities using a multi-tasking principal-agent model. The em-
phasis of their analysis is twofold. First, they explicitly take into account that there are
objective upper bounds to the amount of eﬀort that can be undertaken by an individual
agent. Second, they analyze how the accuracy of technology (used to monitor the eﬀort
levels) aﬀects the optimal incentive schemes.
2In this paper we also make use of a multi-task principal-agent model. However, in ad-
dition to focusing on the inducement of behavior as in Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [9] and
Segerson and Tietenberg [20], the question we want to answer is how the incentives aﬀect the
organizational structure of the corporation. To do so, we adopt the model of Besanko et al.
[2], who make a distinction between a functional organization and a product-based organiza-
tion. When a corporation is organized in a functional mode, it consists of several functional
departments (e.g., production, R&D, marketing, ﬁnance, personnel, and environmental pro-
tection), whereas a corporation is organized into product lines in case of a product-based
organization.
It is assumed that, if a corporation chooses a functional structure, then it features a
simple structure with just two departments: one department taking care of production (and
marketing and ﬁnance) of the ﬁnal good; the other taking care of environmental protection.
These two actions lead to a certain level of gross proﬁts and a certain amount of expected
environmental damages. The CEO’s of the corporation can develop an incentive scheme
for both departments, but cannot perfectly monitor the individual managers’ eﬀort levels.
However, as proposed by Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [9], they can observe a signal that is
imperfectly correlated with environmental performance.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we provide an analysis of the eﬀects of
environmental penalties on organizational structure, which was identiﬁed as a future research
need by Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [9]. Second, contrary to [9], we do not consider the
ﬁrm’s wish to provide incentives for environmental protection as exogenous, but we derive
this from proﬁt maximizing behavior by the ﬁrm. The relationship between environmental
performance and proﬁts is determined by the diﬀerent civil liability rules to which the ﬁrm is
subjected, as in Segerson and Tietenberg [20] − in this sense, our analysis also complements
this strand of literature.
3The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic modeling framework
and features the explicit distinction between a product-based and functional organization
under the assumption of risk averse managers. We analyze the speciﬁc situation of risk
neutral managers in Section 3. Section 4 considers the special cases of zero spillover eﬀects
and absence of diseconomies of span, assuming that managers are risk averse. Conclusions
and directions for future research are given in Section 5.
2 The model
2.1 Introduction
Consider a ﬁrm that consists of a risk-neutral owner and two risk-averse managers. The ﬁrm
sells two products: 1 and 2. There are two functional areas: environmental protection E
and production P.1 For product i = 1,2, denote ei and pi as the eﬀort levels expended on
functions E and P respectively. Assuming perfect symmetry, these eﬀort levels have two
results. First, proﬁts before wages and environmental penalties, are2:
πi = βpi + γei + θβpj + ξγej, i = 1,2 and i 6= j (1)
where β > 0 and γ < 0. No assumptions are made with respect to the sign of the spillover
coeﬃcients θ and ξ. Moreover, assume that proﬁts can be measured without noise.3
Second, environmental damages D due to product i are:
Di = bpi + gei + vbpj + wgej, i = 1,2 and i 6= j (2)
where b > 0 and g < 0. Like with proﬁts, we make no prior assumptions with respect to the
signs of the spillover coeﬃcients v and w. Now several possibilities exist. Suppose ﬁrst that
1Production should be seen here as a proxy for all non-environmental related functional areas.
2From now on we shall call this “gross proﬁts”.
3One could also argue that γ > 0. For instance, proﬁts could increase due to improvements in material usage
and energy eﬃciency of the production process, i.e. the Porter hypothesis (e.g., [17], [18], [19]). However,
Porter’s story is basically a dynamic one. Due to intensiﬁed environmental innovative activities (a higher
environmental eﬀort level), ﬁrm proﬁts could go up in the future. Our story is, in essence, static. No dynamic
considerations about future proﬁts are included; only current levels are investigated. Therefore, our focus is
on the short run assuming γ < 0, i.e., we follow the path that more environmental eﬀort adversely aﬀects
short run proﬁts.
4the EPA generates the following veriﬁable sign of environmental quality ˜ D linked to product
i:
˜ Di = Di + ˜ εi, i = 1,2 (3)
where the measurement error ˜ εi has zero mean and (˜ ε1, ˜ ε2) follows a bivariate normal distri-












D is the variance of measured environmental quality and s ∈ [−1,1] is the correlation
between measured product-line environmental damages. This formulation makes sense if the
two products are produced on diﬀerent locations or lead to emissions of diﬀerent pollutants.
However, if the two products are produced on the same location and lead to the emission of




Di + ˜ εi. (5)
We shall not consider this possibility here, but it is left for future research. Following Besanko
et. al. [2], we assume that it is impossible to identify the contributions of the functional areas.
In order to simplify the analysis a bit, we directly concentrate on the diﬀerent penalty schemes
as proposed by Segerson and Tietenberg [20]. They consider the following instruments:
monetary penalties imposed on the ﬁrm, monetary penalties imposed on the manager and
criminal sanctions imposed on the managers.
Throughout this paper, we shall focus on the situation where monetary penalties are
imposed directly on the managers. Therefore, in the case of a product-based organization,
we assume that manager i pays a penalty that is equal to environmental damage caused by
product i. In the case of a functional organization, we suppose all managers are held jointly
liable. This means that in our situation of two functional areas, the two managers pay a ﬁne
5that is proportional to total damage with the sum of the ﬁnes equal to total environmental
damage.4 In order to allow a comparison with Segerson and Tietenberg [20], we shall verify
these results with what happens when the penalties are imposed directly on the ﬁrm rather
than on individual managers. The study of criminal sanctions is left as an area for further
research.
Let us ﬁnally move to the incentives provided within the ﬁrm. In a classic paper, Holm-
strom [11] has shown that incentive schemes should incorporate all signals that allow to
reduce the noise in the measurement of an agent’s eﬀort levels. In this model, there are four
performance measurements: product-line proﬁts and observed environmental performance
(π1,π2, ˜ D1, ˜ D2). We will restrict the compensation packages provided by the ﬁrm to be linear
functions of these variables.5 Moreover, it can be veriﬁed that a contract that depends on
all these variables simultaneously is always overdetermined, both in a functional and in a
product-based organization - this shows that there are redundancies in the information pro-
vided by these signals. Therefore, compensation of product managers is only linked to the
performance in their own generated product. Similarly, compensation of functional managers
is only linked to performance in their own ﬁeld. We shall argue below that it is not possible
to improve on these schemes.
If the contributions of individual products to pollution can be observed, total wages ˜ Wi
received by the manager of product division i = 1,2 is:
˜ Wi = ai0 + (πi; ˜ Di)ai − ˜ Di, (6a)
where ai0 is a constant, aT
i ≡ (aπi,aDi) represents the payment schedule for a product
division and ˜ Di is the penalty schedule imposed by the EPA on manager i. If the ﬁrm adopts
4If we would not introduce this last assumption, then, for equal environmental damages, the total ﬁnes
paid under the two organizational structures would be diﬀerent. This assumption therefore allows to isolate
any possible eﬀect in this sense.
5This assumption may seem restrictive − see however Holmstrom and Milgrom [12] for a classic justiﬁcation.
6a functional organization, payments are:
˜ We = αe0 + ˜ DTαe − ψe( ˜ D1 + ˜ D2), (6b)
˜ Wp = αp0 + πTαp − ψp( ˜ D1 + ˜ D2), (6c)
where αe0 and αp0 are constants, αT
e ≡ (αD1,αD2) represents the payment schedule for an
environmental division and αT
p ≡ (απ1,απ2) is the payment schedule for a production division,
while πT ≡ (π1,π2,) and ˜ DT ≡ ( ˜ D1, ˜ D2,). ψi( ˜ D1+ ˜ D2) denotes the penalty schedule imposed
by the EPA on manager i in a functional organization.6





2 for i = 1,2
vT
i Dvi
2 for i = E,P
(7)
where zT
i = (pi,ei) (i = 1,2) and vT
i = (i1,i2) (i = e,p) are the eﬀort vectors in a product-
based and functional organization respectively. That is, the product manager must decide how
to allocate eﬀort between two functional tasks while the functional manager must decide how
to allocate eﬀort between the two products. Matrix D measures the extent of diseconomies
of span, this is “the extra cost that results when a manager must split his time and attention







with δ ∈ [0,1]. Combining (6a) and (7), the expected utility EU for a manager i is obtained:
EUi ≡ E( ˜ Wi) −
1
2
ρV ar( ˜ Wi) − ∆i, (9)
where ρ > 0 represents the manager’s risk aversion, which is assumed to be constant and the
same for all managers. It is straightforward to verify that the variance of the compensation
6With ψ1 + ψ2 = 1.
7schemes ˜ Wi are equal to:7
V ar( ˜ Wi) = σ2
D(1 + aT
i Wai − 2aT
i v), (10a)
V ar( ˜ We) = αT
e ΩDαe + 2(1 + s)ψ2
eσ2
D − 2(1 + s)ψeσ2
DαT
e u, (10b)
V ar( ˜ Wp) = 2(1 + s)ψ2
pσ2
D (10c)










. Now, (9) can be explicitly speciﬁed for the
two distinguished organizational structures. Substituting (6a), (7) and (10a) into (9), the
expected utility for managers in a product-based organization reads:
EUi = ai0 + (zT
i Qi + zT
j Qj;zT
i Si + zT
j Sj)ai − (zT

































. The expected utilities of
managers that are engaged in a ﬁrm with a functional structure can be derived in the same
way. That is,
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As in Besanko et. al. [2], we normalize the managers’ reservation utility to zero. The
intercept of the compensation schemes can then be used to satisfy the participation con-
straint.8 In that case, the owner’s objective is to maximize total surplus, i.e., proﬁts, minus
7See appendix for the derivation of (10a), (10b) and (10c).
8Note that the participation constraint is expressed in expected terms. This means that there is no guarantee
8risk premium, minus disutility of eﬀort, minus penalties imposed on the managers, subject to
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(Qi;Si)ai − Si = Dzi, (14)
with (14) representing the usual incentive compatibility constraints for i = 1,2. Note that in
(13), zT
i (Qi + Qj) is production manager i’s contribution to total proﬁts9 and not the proﬁt
on product i. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ai is:10
(Qi;Si)








After substitution of the expressions for Qi,Qj,Si,Sj,W,D and v as given above into
(15), the term between squared brackets on the RHS of (15) can be written as:
ρσ2
DW + (Qi;Si)




β2 + γ2 − 2δβγ βb + γg − δ(βg + γb)





In general, this matrix is non-singular and the incentive scheme has therefore a unique solu-
tion. Now we do the same for a functional organization.
that the managers will obtain their reservation utility for all possible realizations of the stochastic variable.
This also means that it is possible that, for some realizations of the stochastic variable, the managers will
have to make a ﬁnancial transfer to the ﬁrm (rather than the other way round) and that this transfer exceeds
their assets. With imperfect capital markets, the managers might not be able to borrow against their future
wages and they will ﬁle for bankruptcy (or, equivalently, with imperfect insurance markets, they will not be
able to insure themselves against extreme contingecies). This is an important point to which we shall come
back later in this paper.
9This is the direct impact on product i plus the spillover eﬀects to product j.
10See appendix for the intermediate steps in order to derive (15).
92.2.2 Functional organization
Maximization of the surplus under a functional organization is expressed by:
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraints for i = e,p:
Teαe − ψeTeu = Dve, (18a)
Rpαp − ψpTpu = Dvp. (18b)
Here, we also have a diﬀerence with Besanko et. al. [2] because we have to take into account
the additional risk imposed on the managers through the environmental ﬁnes. Moreover,
these ﬁnes do not go to the owner of the ﬁrm.
Before proceeding, note that ψe + ψp = 1, implying that Πfunc in (17) can be simpliﬁed
to:
Πfunc = vT
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From (19) we see that the problem of the environmental and product manager can be sepa-
rated. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to αe and with respect to αp are then respec-
tively:11
TeD−1 (Re + (ψe − 1)Te)u + ρ(1 + s)ψeσ2
Du = (ρΩD + TeD−1Te)αe, (20a)
RpD−1 (Rp + (ψp − 1)Tp)u = RpD−1Rpαp. (20b)
11The intermediate steps are again provided in the appendix.
10If ρΩD + TeD−1Te in (20a) and RpD−1 in (20b) have full rank, the incentive problems have
again a unique solution.
So far, we have examined the modeling framework with a focus on risk averse managers.
We will now consider the case where managers are risk neutral and examine how this aﬀects
the diﬀerent relationships within the two organizational structures.
3 Risk neutral managers
3.1 Product-based organization
In case of a product-based organization, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ai reduces
to:
(Qi;Si)
T D−1(Qi + Qj − Sj) = (Qi;Si)
T D−1 (Qi;Si)ai. (21)
If (1 − δ2)(βg − γb) 6= 0 then (Qi;Si)
T D−1 has full rank. Premultiplying both sides of this
equality by its inverse, we obtain:
(Qi;Si)
−1 (Qi + Qj − Sj) = ai. (22)
Further developing this expression leads to
aπi =




β(ξγ − wg) − γ(θβ − vb)
βg − γb
. (23b)
From (23) we see that the existence of diseconomies of span does not aﬀect the optimal
incentive scheme. Without spillover eﬀects, i.e., θ = ξ = w = v = 0, we would obtain
aπi = 1 and aDi = 0. In this case, optimal compensation consists of holding the product
manager fully liable for proﬁts in his product and not linking compensation to environmental
damages, which have already been fully internalized by the ﬁnes imposed by the regulator.
In other words, without spillover eﬀects, we obtain the standard result that with risk-neutral
managers it is optimal to “sell” the ﬁrm to the manager (or, to put it still diﬀerently, to oﬀer
11a “franchise” contract). However, with spillover eﬀects it is not optimal to hold a product
manager entirely liable for the proﬁts in his area, as this ignores the spillover eﬀects to gross
proﬁts generated by the other product manager and to the ﬁnes paid by the other product
manager. As a result, the ﬁnes imposed by the environmental regulator are not suﬃcient and
need to be supplemented by an internal incentive scheme.
In both cases, the net spillover eﬀects of productive activities are captured by the term
θβ − vb, whereas ξγ − wg captures the net spillover eﬀects in environmental protection.
Substitution of (22) into (14), the following eﬀort levels are derived:
(Qi;Si)(Qi;Si)
−1 (Qi + Qj − Sj) − Si = Dzi, (24)
or
D−1 (Qi + Qj − Sj − Si) = zi. (25)
Thus, while diseconomies of span do not aﬀect the optimal incentive scheme, they do aﬀect
the optimal eﬀort levels. Substituting (25) in (13) the expected proﬁts read:
(Qi + Qj − Sj − Si)
T D−1 (Qi + Qj − Sj − Si). (26)
In scalar form this equalizes
1
1 − δ2{[(1 + θ)β − (1 + v)b]
2 + [(1 + ξ)γ − (1 + w)g]
2
−2δ [(1 + θ)β − (1 + v)b][(1 + ξ)γ − (1 + w)g]}. (27)
For δ ∈ [0,1], the expected proﬁts (27) are always positive.
3.2 Functional organization
3.2.1 Environmental manager
TeD−1 is a square matrix. If it has full rank, we can premultiply both sides of the equation
by its inverse in order to obtain:
(Te)
−1 (Re + (ψe − 1)Te)u = αe, (28)
12or:
(Te)
−1 Reu + (ψe − 1)u = αe. (29)





(1 + ξ)γ + (ψe − 1)g(1 + w)
(1 + ξ)γ + (ψe − 1)g(1 + w)

= αe. (30)
The interpretation of (30) is as follows. (1+ξ)γ is the total decrease in gross proﬁts due to
a unit increase in environmental protection. (1−ψe)g(1+w) = ψpg(1+w) is the decrease in
environmental penalties paid by the production manager due a unit increase in environmental
management. Thus, if |(1 − ψe)g|(1 + w) > (1 + ξ)γ, the ﬁrm will reward the environmental
manager for an increase in environmental protection (otherwise, the environmental manager
will be penalized). This per unit reward or punishment is proportional to the net externality
the environmental manager imposes on the other agents within the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, substituting (30) into the incentive compatibility constraint for i = e (18a)
yields
(Re − Te)u = Dve. (31)
Note that ve is independent of the exact distribution of environmental penalties amongst
managers, although αe is not. Moreover, although the incentive scheme is independent of the
existence of diseconomies of span, the optimal eﬀort levels are not.
3.2.2 Production manager
Rp is a square matrix. If it has full rank, we can premultiply both sides of the equation by
its inverse in order to obtain:
(Rp + (ψp − 1)Tp)u = Rpαp, (32)
13or:
αp = u + (ψp − 1)(Rp)
−1 Tpu, (33)
and more explicitly:
αp = β−1(1 − θ)−1

(1 − θ)β + (ψp − 1)(1 + v)b
(1 − θ)β + (ψp − 1)(1 + v)b

. (34)
As before, we see that the incentive scheme is independent of the existence of diseconomies of
span. The interpretation of (34) is as follows. (1−θ)β is the increase in gross proﬁts due to a
unit increase in production eﬀort. (1−ψp)(1+v)b = ψe(1+v)b is the increase in environmental
penalties paid by the environmental manager due to a unit increase in production eﬀort. Thus,
if (1 − θ)β > (1 − ψp)(1 + v)b, the ﬁrm will reward the product manager for an increase in
production eﬀort. Otherwise, the product manager will be penalized. This per unit reward
or punishment is proportional to the net externality the product manager imposes on the
other agents within the ﬁrm. Substituting (34) in (18b) gives:
(Rp − Tp)u = Dvp. (35)
Here vp is independent of the exact distribution of environmental penalties amongst man-
agers, although αp is not. As in case of the environmental manager, the incentive scheme is
independent of the existence of diseconomies of span, whereas the optimal eﬀort levels are
not.
In the following two subsections we will compare the two organizational forms in terms
of proﬁts and eﬀort levels, keeping in mind the assumption of risk neutrality.
3.3 Organizational comparison by proﬁt levels under risk neutrality





i (Qi + Qj) − (zT








14The ﬁrst-order condition for zi then would be:
Qi + Qj − Si − Sj = Dzi, (37)
which exactly coincides with (25). Therefore, the incentive scheme we have developed for a
product-based organization allows to eﬀectively obtain the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels. However,
by substituting (35) and (31) into (19) we obtain that, for ρ = 0, expected proﬁts in a
functional organization reduce to:
1
2
uT(Re − Te)TD−1(Re − Te)u +
1
2
uT(Rp − Tp)TD−1(Rp − Tp)u. (38)




((1 + ξ)γ − (1 + w)g)




This shows clearly that the distribution of the joint liability between the two functional man-
agers does not aﬀect total proﬁts, and has thus no eﬃciency eﬀects.12 Comparing this with
(27), it is straightforward to verify that expected proﬁts are higher in a product organization
for δ > 0. When δ = 0, proﬁts are the same under both organizational structures.
Following the same procedure as above, it is straightforward to verify that if the ﬁrm
would be held directly liable for the environmental damages, then it would choose a product-
based organization and write an incentive contract that would induce ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels.
Therefore,
Proposition 1 If managers are risk neutral, then it does not matter whether environmental
liability is imposed on the ﬁrms or on the managers: a product-based organization always
dominates a functional organization and allows to obtain ﬁrst best eﬀort levels. If there are
no diseconomies of span (δ = 0), both organizational forms are equivalent. This result is in-
12At least, if there is no upper bound to the amounts that can be imposed on individual managers. Otherwise,
it might be optimal to impose the highest ﬁne on the manager with the “deepest pockets”.
15dependent of the magnitude of spillover eﬀects. Total proﬁts within a functional organization
do not depend on the allocation of liability between the functional managers.
In order to understand the result in proposition 1, note ﬁrst that (30) and (34) imply
that the incentive scheme for the environmental manager does not depend on the parameters
that determine how the production manager’s eﬀort aﬀects gross proﬁts and environmental
damages (this is, β, b, θ and v), and that the production manager’s incentives do not depend
on the parameters that determine how the environmental manager’s eﬀort aﬀects gross proﬁts
and environmental damages (this is, γ, g, ξ and w). In other words, in a functional orga-
nization, the incentive schemes do not contain all relevant information (whereas they do in
a product-based organization). This does, however, not follow from the particular incentive
scheme we have considered here: it can be veriﬁed that this result is true for all conceivable
incentive schemes and follows directly from the separability we have identiﬁed in (19). Thus,
functional organizations provide less information than product-based organizations.
Another way to understand this result is to note that (30) and (34) also show that, even
without spillover eﬀects, it is impossible to oﬀer a “franchise contract” to the functional
managers. It is interesting to compare this result with the conclusions obtained by Segerson
and Tietenberg [20]. They claim that with risk neutral managers, “eﬃciency can be achieved
(...) with a penalty on the responsible individual” [20, p. 187]. We have shown here that
this indeed true for a product based organization. In the case of a functional organization,
it is not possible to attribute environmental damages to the actions of an individual. In that
case, Segerson and Tietenberg suggest to use a ﬂat wage for individual managers. Our results
here show that this is not optimal in general.
Our analysis also shows that, with risk-neutral managers with large enough assets, at
least one argument against managerial liability is not valid. Indeed, Kornhauser [14, p.
1351] has argued that “enterprises are more able than courts to identify responsible actors;
16consequently, this fact suggests that more care results from a system of enterprise liability.”
Our analysis shows that this is not true with a product-based organization. The ﬁrst-best
can be obtained, even if the regulator does not know the spillover eﬀects as long as the ﬁrm’s
owner knows them: the ﬁrm’s owner can compensate for any misallocation induced by the
liability rule imposed by the regulator. Moreover, there is no need for the ﬁrm to monitor
eﬀort levels.
Finally, it is also possible to interpret Proposition 1 in the light of the Coase theorem (see
Coase [3]): as the impossibility for a ﬁrm’s owner to “sell” the ﬁrm to a functional manager
makes it impossible to obtain the ﬁrst best solution if there are diseconomies of span, this
impossibility of writing a “franchise contract” is, per deﬁnition, a transaction cost linked to
this organizational structure.
3.3.1 Organizational comparison by eﬀort levels under risk neutrality
With respect to eﬀort levels, the comparison is also straightforward. Table 1 contains the ex-
pressions of the environmental and product eﬀort levels under the two organizational modes.
The eﬀort levels under a product-based organization are described by (25). The environmen-
tal and production eﬀort under a functional organization are determined by (31) and (35)
respectively.
Table 1: Eﬀort levels under a product and functional organizational structure











Eﬀort levels are the same for both organizational modes if there are no diseconomies
of span. However, we have no prior restrictions on the signs of (1 + ξ)γ − (1 + w)g and
17(1+θ)β−(1+v)b and therefore we cannot say under which regime eﬀort levels are the highest
when δ > 0. Otherwise, it is straightforward to verify that production (environmental) eﬀort
is higher (lower) under a product-based organization if and only if
(1 + θ)β − (1 + v)b > (1 + ξ)γ − (1 + w)g. (40)
How can we interpret (40)? In a product-based organization with risk neutral managers,
proﬁts for product line i are: zT




i Dzi. Compared to a problem
without environmental policy, the only diﬀerence lies in the term zT
i Si+zT
j Sj: the ﬁne levied
to product manager i. Therefore, ﬁrm proﬁts before compensation of eﬀort are zT
i (Q − S)
rather than zT
i Q as in Besanko et. al. [2]. In their terminology, production is the dominant
function if (1+θ)β−(1+v)b > (1+ξ)γ−(1+w)g. Otherwise, it is environmental protection.
In turn,
Proposition 2 If, after the introduction of environmental ﬁnes, production is still the “dom-
inant” function, then production eﬀort is higher under a product-based organization than un-
der a functional organization. If, after the introduction of environmental ﬁnes, environmental
protection becomes the “dominant” function, then environmental protection is higher under
a product-based organization than under a functional organization. The organizational form
that induces the highest environmental eﬀort, induces the lowest production eﬀort and vice
versa.
The results above imply that there is always a dominant function in our model. Proposi-
tion 2 is then completely compatible with the observation of Besanko et. al. [2, p. 21] that
“if there is a dominant function, eﬀort costs tend to be higher in a functional organization”.
Now we have analyzed the eﬀects under the assumption of risk neutral managers, we now
turn back to the situation of risk averse managers but analyze the cases when there are no
spillover eﬀects and no diseconomies of span.
184 Absence of spillover eﬀects and diseconomies of span
Here we keep the assumption that managers are risk averse, however, suppose now that
there are no spillover eﬀects and no diseconomies of span. Without spillover eﬀects, i.e.,
θ = ξ = w = v, we get Sj = Qj = (0 0)T. To simplify notation, let S ≡ Si and Q ≡ Qi. Let
us ﬁrst look at the incentives for the product managers within a product-based organization
and then turn to the incentives within a functional organization.
4.1 Product-based organization
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ai can be written as:
(Q;S)TQ + ρσ2
Dv = (ρσ2
DW + (Q;S)T(Q;S))ai. (41)














where k1 = βg − γb,k2 = βb + γg and k3 = β2 + γ2. In case of risk neutrality (42) reduces
to: (1,0)T, which is exactly the result we already obtained in Section 3. So, in order to
compensate for the risk imposed by the environmental ﬁnes when managers are risk averse,
the ﬁrm must introduce a wage that depends on environmental performance, while this is
not necessary if the managers are risk neutral. Moreover,
k2
1 + ρσ2





which means that the incentives for production eﬀort are lower under risk aversion because
higher production eﬀort increases the expected ﬁnes.















19Under risk neutrality, this reduces to: (β − b,γ − g)T. Production eﬀort will be higher






> (β − b)k2
1 + ρσ2
D(k3 − k2)β, i.e., if βg > bγ.









D(k3 − k2)γ, i.e., if γb > gβ. Thus:
Proposition 3 In a product-based organization without spillover eﬀects, risk aversion leads
to a decrease in production eﬀort (increase in environmental eﬀort) if and only if βg > bγ.






D W + (Q;S)
T (Q;S))ai (45)
By substituting this into (13) and rearranging, we ﬁnd the expression for total proﬁts:
(β − b)














It is straightforward to verify that a product-based organization would lead to exactly the
same proﬁts if the environmental ﬁnes were imposed directly on the ﬁrm. Thus, contrary to
what was conjectured by Segerson and Tietenberg [20, footnote 11], we obtain that the risk
aversion of the managers is not an argument against holding them liable rather than the ﬁrm:
who has to pay the ﬁnes does not aﬀect how risk is shared between the ﬁrm and its managers.
Of course, in reality, a ﬁrm’s assets will generally be larger than that of a manager. A ﬁrm
will therefore generally be able to aﬀord higher monetary penalties than a manager.
Let us now turn back to a functional organization in order to explore how absence of
spillover eﬀects and absence of diseconomies of span aﬀect the incentives of the environmental
and product manager respectively.
204.2 Functional organization
4.2.1 Environmental manager
In this case, (ρΩD + TeTe) is equal to:

ρσ2












gγ + (ψe − 1)g2 + ρ(1 + s)ψeσ2
D




With risk neutrality (48) this reduces to: (g)
−1 (γ+(ψe−1)g,γ+(ψe−1)g)T. Now substitute
(48) in (18a) in order to obtain the eﬀort levels:
 
ρ(1 + s)σ2






We see that environmental eﬀort does not depend on the ﬁnes levied on the environmental
manager. With risk neutrality, environmental eﬀort reduces to γ − g. Thus, environmental




> g2(γ − g), which always
holds. Actually, (49) directly shows that:
Proposition 4 In a functional organization, the environmental manager’s eﬀort level is
decreasing in his level of risk aversion, but is independent of the ﬁnes he has to pay.
What is the environmental manager’s contribution to expected proﬁts? Using the sym-
metry of (ρΩD + TeTe)−1, it can be shown that (see appendix for derivation):
g2(γ − g)2
ρ(1 + s)σ2




D+g2 < 1, the eﬀect of risk aversion is that the functional manager’s contribution
to total proﬁts decreases with this factor. This factor is independent of the ﬁne levied on
the environmental manager. This is consistent with the observation we made with respect to
environmental eﬀort. Apparently, it is indeed optimal for the ﬁrm to compensate the eﬀects
of ﬁnes imposed on the environmental manager.
214.2.2 Production manager
Because Rp is a square matrix with full rank, multiplication by its inverse yields
(Rp + (ψp − 1)Tp)u = Rpαp, (51)
or




β + (ψp − 1)b
β + (ψp − 1)b

. (53)
Here β is the increase in gross proﬁts due to a unit increase in production eﬀort. (1−ψp)b =
ψeb is the increase in environmental penalties paid by the environmental manager due to
a unit increase in production eﬀort. Thus, if β > (1 − ψp)b, then the ﬁrm will reward the
production manager for an increase in production eﬀort (otherwise, the production manager
will be penalized). This per unit reward or punishment is proportional to the net externality
he imposes on the other agents within the ﬁrm.






where vp is independent of the exact distribution of environmental penalties amongst man-
agers, even though αp is not. We can even go a step further by arguing that:
Proposition 5 In a functional organization, risk aversion does not aﬀect the production
manager’s incentives or eﬀort levels.
Let us now look at the production manager’s contribution to expected proﬁts. Substitu-
tion of (54) in (64) and simplifying yields:13
(β − b)2 − ρ(1 + s)ψ2
pσ2
D. (55)
13See appendix for intermediate steps.
22Equation (55) expresses the fact that the risk imposed on the production manager does not
depend on the incentive scheme received by the ﬁrm (which is completely deterministic), but
only on the risk imposed by the environmental ﬁnes. Therefore, the production manager’s
contribution to expected proﬁts exactly decreases with the risk premium he must receive
from the ﬁrm in order to satisfy his participation constraint. As the ﬁnes do not aﬀect
incentives, but only impose a risk on the production manager, these ﬁnes are a deadweight
loss. Therefore, it is socially optimal to set ψp = 0. Alternatively, it is straightforward to
verify that the same eﬀect would be obtained if all ﬁnes were imposed directly on the ﬁrm
(keep in mind that the ﬁrm is risk neutral).
Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [9, p. 238] have suggested that in a multi-departmental
organization, “proﬁt should be the responsibility of line managers with incentive contracts,
while environmental risk reduction should be assigned to personnel under a ﬁxed-salary con-
tract.” Our results here provide no justiﬁcation for this conjecture. The reason is that [9], a
priori, presume that environmental activities are more diﬃcult to monitor than production
activities. This problem disappears in our setting due to the linearity of the model.14
Now all expressions that show to what extent the two organizational structures contribute
to expected proﬁts are available, we can compare the regimes with each other on this variable.
4.3 Organizational comparison by contribution to expected proﬁts
Total proﬁts under a functional organization are equal to the sum of (55) and (50):





D + g2. (56)
This we have to compare with total expected proﬁts under a product-based organization (46):
(β − b)




(βg − γb)2 + ρσ2
D (β2 + γ2)
. (57)
14On the one hand, our model might seem somewhat restrictive in this regard compared to [9]. On the
other hand, the conclusion of [9] presumably only holds in the limit case where environmental eﬀorts cannot
be estimated from measurable results.






(βg − γb)2 + ρσ2





D + g2 . (58)
In general, it is diﬃcult to say anything about this expression, even with ψp = 0 (remember
that we have shown that ψp is a deadweight loss). This ambiguity can be better understood
if we compare our results with Besanko et. al. [2].
The central result in their paper is that without cross-product externalities or disec-
onomies of span, a product-based organization yields higher proﬁts than a functional one if
all functions have the same eﬀect on proﬁts (Proposition 1). The intuition for their result
is that in “a product organization, any desired symmetric level of eﬀorts can be induced by
tying a manager’s reward to the performance of the division that he oversees. (...) In a
functional organization (...) the desired symmetric eﬀort levels can be obtained by linking
the pay of each manager to the performance of each of the two products”. Therefore, “the
head of a product division bears the risk associated with the noisy proﬁt signal in his prod-
uct while the head of a functional division bears the risk associated with noisy proﬁt signals
in both product lines.” Moreover, “in a product organization, the owner (...) can link the
compensation of a division manager (...) to the proﬁts of the other division to provide him
with insurance against compensation risk without aﬀecting eﬀort incentives. By contrast, in
a functional organization desired eﬀort levels can be obtained only by linking the pay of each
manager to the proﬁts of both products. Hence ‘free insurance’ against compensation risk is
unavailable.”
In our model, however, the nature of the problem itself implies that the two functions
have asymmetric eﬀects, and thus that we have a dominant function. In Proposition 2 of [2],
it is then shown that the existence of a dominant function favors a functional organization,
and that this eﬀect becomes more pronounced when the dominant function becomes more
24so. Besanko et. al. [2, p. 13] explain this eﬀect as follows: “The incentive sensitivity
eﬀect means that given the higher marginal proﬁtability of function X, the owner ideally
wants to induce greater eﬀort levels in that function than in function Y . The owner can
achieve this with a functional form: it suﬃces to give the manager in charge of function X
higher-powered incentives than the manager in charge of function Y . In a product-based
organization, however, the division manager for product i controls both xi and yi, so it
is not possible to give higher-powered incentives for activity xi than for activity yi. As a
result, the owner is forced to make an ‘incentive compromise’.” This explains why, in general,
the comparison between a functional and a product based organization is ambiguous in our
model. Therefore, let us consider some special cases.
First, suppose that environmental protection does not aﬀect gross proﬁts, i.e., γ = 0.15
In this case, environmental protection only aﬀects total proﬁts because the owner must com-















Proposition 6 A product-based organization dominates a functional organization if envi-
ronmental protection does not aﬀect gross proﬁts.
Suppose next that there is a perfect negative correlation between the measurement errors
in environmental performance. Then (56) reduces to the ﬁrst-best proﬁts, while (46) is







D < 0. (60)
15The other extreme case (b = 0) does not make any economic sense: if production eﬀort does not aﬀect
the environment, then no environmental regulation is needed.
25So,
Proposition 7 If there is a perfect negative correlation between the measurement errors in
environmental performance, a functional organization allows to obtain the ﬁrst-best solution
and dominates the product organization. The higher the correlation, the lower the proﬁts
under a functional organization.
The intuition behind this result is as follows (note that it follows exactly the same logic
as the intuition Besanko et. al. provide for Proposition 1 in their paper). In case of a
product-based organization, the product manager is always subject to some risk, as the only
stochastic component in his remuneration is the pollution linked to his own product. In the
case of a functional organization, both managers are subject to two risks. If the correlation
between these two risks is perfectly negative, they both have a perfectly diversiﬁed portfolio.
5 Conclusions and directions for future research
5.1 Conclusions
This paper presents a principal-agent model to examine how diﬀerent liability rules for envi-
ronmental damages aﬀect the compensation and penalty schemes oﬀered to individual man-
agers. These schemes depend on the managers’ contribution to proﬁts and their performance
on environmental damages caused by production respectively, and are evaluated both within
a product-based and a functional organization. In the former case, a ﬁrm is divided into
product lines. The latter case refers to a ﬁrm that is organized as a collection of various
functional departments; in our analysis a production and an environmental department. It
is also veriﬁed how these liability rule aﬀect the choice between organizational forms.
When managers are risk neutral and liability is unlimited, it does not matter whether it is
the ﬁrm or the managers who are held liable for environmental damages. Moreover, if there
are no spill-over eﬀects between product lines, then a product-based organization allows to
26obtain ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels by oﬀering a “franchise contract” to the managers. In the other
case, the ﬁrm’s owner can compensate for any possible misallocation induced by a liability
rule that ignores spillovers within the ﬁrm. Moreover, if there are diseconomies of span, then a
product-based organization dominates strictly a ﬁrm with a functional organization structure.
In case there are no diseconomies of span, both organizational forms are equivalent. These
results are independent of the height of spillover eﬀects. The dominance of a product-based
organization is due to the fact that contracts in a functional organization can never be based
on all relevant information without being redundant.
If environmental protection becomes the dominant function after the introduction of envi-
ronmental taxes, then environmental protection is higher under a product-based organization.
In case production is the dominant function after the introduction of environmental taxes,
production eﬀort will be higher in a product-based organization then in a functional organiza-
tion. The organizational form that induces the highest environmental eﬀort when managers
are risk neutral, induces the lowest production eﬀort and vice versa.
We have also analyzed the problem with risk-averse managers in the particular case with-
out spillover eﬀects or diseconomies of span. In the case of a product-based organization, it
is again shown that it does not matter whether it is the ﬁrm or the managers that are held
liable for environmental damages, as long as the managers do not face limited liability. In
a functional organization, the environmental manager’s eﬀort level is decreasing in his level
of risk aversion, but also independent of the ﬁnes he has to pay. Moreover, risk aversion
does not aﬀect the production manager’s eﬀort levels in such a situation. More important,
we show that the ﬁnes imposed on the production manager only aﬀect expected proﬁts, but
without aﬀecting incentives. Therefore, in a functional organization it is optimal, either not
to hold production managers liable for environmental damages, or, equivalently, to hold the
ﬁrm liable for environmental damages.
27With risk averse managers, there is no longer a dominant organizational form. However,
if there is a perfect negative correlation between measurement errors in environmental perfor-
mance, then a functional organization allows to obtain ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels and dominates a
product-based organization. The higher the correlation, the lower proﬁts are in a functional
organization. Also, if environmental protection does not aﬀect gross proﬁts, then a product-
based organization outperforms a functional organization. Otherwise, no general statements
are possible.
We have also shown that several conjectures formulated in earlier contributions are not
conﬁrmed in our analysis. First, even if environmental damages cannot be attributed to
the actions of one speciﬁc individual, ﬂat wages are not optimal. Second, in the case of a
product-based organization, risk aversion of the managers is not an argument against holding
them liable rather than the ﬁrm. Third, environmental managers should not necessarily be
given a ﬁxed-wage contract.
5.2 Directions for future research
There are several directions for future research, that follow directly from some restrictive
assumptions we have used. First of all, while our modeling approach allows to obtain an
explicit solution for the problem, it also has an important drawback: the eﬀect of eﬀort
on gross proﬁts and environmental damages is perfectly linear. However, in reality, it is
likely that there are ﬁxed costs related to each task (see Corts [5] for an example). These
ﬁxed costs are arguably more important in a functional organization than in a product-based
organization.16 This suggests that our analysis contains a bias in favor of product-based
organizations. The linearity of the model also implies that there is no constraint on the sign
of the optimal eﬀort levels. It is, however, unclear how negative eﬀorts should be interpreted.
16It is arguably more costly to acquire skills in ﬁnance and marketing after having acquired skills in environ-
mental management, than to switch from the general management of one product to the general management
of another product
28A second point is that for some realizations of the stochastic variable, the managers will
have to make a payment to the ﬁrm − these payments may exceed their assets. We have not
explicitly considered this constraint. But the existing literature shows that this can be an
important point. Indeed, Kornhauser [14] already showed that limited liability of the agent
has non-trivial eﬀects on the choice between agent liability and enterprise liability. Similarly,
Sykes [24, p. 1241-42] pointed out that personal liability allows “the principal and the agent
jointly to increase their expected proﬁts by eschewing any risk-sharing agreement or any
insurance policy that averts agent insolvency and concurrently provides greater compensation
to injured parties”.17 One way of restoring “adverse” managerial behavior could then be by
means of criminal sanctions like, for instance, incarceration of managers [20].
A third point is that in our model liability is imposed on either the ﬁrm or the individ-
ual managers. However, as Polinsky and Shavell [16] point out, ﬁrms are more limited in
their capacity to discipline employees than the state, who can, for instance, impose criminal
penalties on top of what the ﬁrms can impose. In that case, the liability optimally imposed
on a ﬁrm should be adapted to reﬂect the higher wages employees will require in order to
compensate them for the risk of criminal ﬁnes. Shavell [22] uses the same framework (but
with no ﬁnes imposed on the employees) to show that a ﬁrm might have the pay above-market
wages (eﬃciency wages) in order to induce the necessary eﬀort levels.
Fourth, we only consider corporate civil liability − for forceful arguments against cor-
porate criminal liability, see Arlen [1], Khanna [13] and Fishel and Sykes [7]; for speciﬁc
applications to environmental crime, see Cohen [4] and Segerson and Tietenberg [20]. It
should be noted though that Arlen’s central argument against corporate criminal liability
can easily be adapted to the case of civil liability: increased enforcement by a corporation
increases the probability of detection of employees who are negligent (and therefore reduces
17Sykes [25] extends this analysis to the case where the scope of employment is litigated.
29the number of negligent employees), but also increases the probability that the government
will detect negligence within the corporation and thus hold the corporation liable.
Fifth, we have limited ourselves to strict liability − liability under negligence rules is
discussed in Chu and Qian [6] in the particular case where the ﬁrm can hide evidence, and
in Segerson and Tietenberg [20] for incarceration based on negligence rules.
Sixth, the CEO in our model is very passive: she limits herself to providing incentives
to the managers. Thus, she does not try to screen prospective employees (see Kornhauser
[14]) or to aﬀect the riskiness of the environment in which individual managers operate (see
Kornhauser [14] and Shavell [22]).
Finally, throughout the paper we considered the case where individual pollution could be
observed. However, as we have mentioned in the introduction, if production of the two goods
generates the same pollutant, then only total pollution can be observed. This is a case we
have not dealt with and is left for further research.
30Appendix
Derivation of equations (10a), (10b) and (10c) First, let us focus on a product-based
organization. In this case, equation (1) implies that πi = zT
i Qi + zT
j Qj (i 6= j). Similarly,
equation (2) implies that Di = zT
i Si + zT
j Sj (i 6= j). Furthermore, V ar( ˜ Wi) = (1 − aDi)2σ2
D;
or in matrix form V ar( ˜ Wi) = σ2
D(1 + aT
i W ai − 2aT
i v). Second, a functional organization.
Equation (1) then also implies πT =
P
j∈E,P vT










and V ar( ˜ Wp) = 2(1 + s)ψ2
pσ2
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Derivation of equations (20a) and (20b) Let us start with the ﬁrst-order condition of
environmental management (20a). Substitution of (18a) in (19) gives:18
[Teαe − ψeTeu]










e ΩDαe + 2(1 + s)ψ2
eσ2






e = Te, this expression can be reorganized to:
αT




















e ΩDαe − ρ(1 + s)ψ2
eσ2
D + ρ(1 + s)ψeσ2
DαT
e u.
Moreover, as the transpose of a scalar matrix is the scalar itself, this expression can be further
simpliﬁed to:
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euTTeTeu − ρ(1 + s)ψ2
eσ2
D. (64)
Therefore, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to αe equals:






Second, the ﬁrst-order condition of production management (20a). Substitute (18b) in (19)
gives:19
[Rpαp − ψpTpu]
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p RpD−1 (Rp + (ψp − 1)Tp)u (65)
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T Tpu − ρ(1 + s)ψ2
pσ2
D,
and the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to αp reads:
RpD−1 (Rp + (ψp − 1)Tp)u = RpD−1Rpαp.

Derivation of equation (50) αT
e (ρΩD + TeTe)αe can be simpliﬁed to:
uT[Te (Re + (ψe − 1)Te)+ρ(1+s)ψeσ2
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D]u.




Te (Re + (ψe − 1)Te) + ρ(1 + s)ψeσ2
D
T (ρΩD + TeTe)
−1

Te (Re + (ψe − 1)Te) + ρ(1 + s)ψeσ2
D











D + g2−1  
gγ + (ψe − 1)g2 + ρ(1 + s)ψeσ2
D
2
−2ψeg(γ − g) − ψ2
eg2 − ρ(1 + s)ψ2
eσ2
D,
which can be reorganized to:
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